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Abstract
The theory of commerce advanced here captures prominent features of retail trade: large
employment, congestion effects, anonymous posted prices, and quantity discounts. This
theory is built around a directed search model where buyers’ preferences are private
information. The analytical solution is easily inserted in a Neoclassical growth framework. In
this framework, the parameters of retail trade are calibrated using commercial margins and
employment. Welfare properties depend on the sellers’ ability to charge two-tier prices. With
two-tier prices, the directed search equilibrium is efficient. Otherwise, it is not. This contrasts
with the full information benchmark, where directed search is always efficient.
JEL classification: D43; D82; D83; E1
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1. Introduction
Commercial margins constitute a very large fraction of the cost of purchasing a
typical good. On average, for every dollar spent before tax in a retail store in the
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United States, only 57 cents reach the producers of the merchandise. The remaining
43 cents cover the margins of the merchant wholesaler (15 cents) and the retailer (28
cents).1 Models with Walrasian markets abstract from commercial activities. This
abstraction would be of little importance if these activities were limited to
transporting commodities from factories to consumers, for then we could think of
commerce as a stage of production with a conventional technology. However, a large
fraction of commercial costs are incurred in the process of contacting and dealing
with buyers in bilateral meetings. Moreover, the size of these costs is independent of
the quantities that buyers end up acquiring and normally cannot be recovered if the
buyer chooses to buy nothing. These facts can only be properly modeled with non-
Walrasian markets. To develop an appropriate framework of analysis, we advance a
directed search model of commerce. This model integrates price competition in an
environment where trades are costly and bilateral. In the model, competition is
multidimensional in the sense that buyers and sellers care not only about prices but
also about the expected time it takes for them to perform a trade. Moreover, to
generate pricing mechanisms which are consistent with those we typically observe in
retail trade, we assume that buyers’ preferences are private information.
Our model seeks to capture the following features of retail trade. The cost of a
single transaction is small. However, buyers seek a diversified basket of goods which
entails performing many transactions. These transactions then employ part of the
scarce labor available in the economy. In addition, the matching of buyers and sellers
is frictional, so quite often some buyers are lining up for assistance in front of a
seller, while another seller nearby is idle. Sellers post price offers to attract buyers to
their outlets. However, buyers care not only about prices, they also care about the
expected time it takes for them to make a purchase. Retail prices typically have the
following properties: they are anonymous (that is they do not depend on the buyers’
preferences), buyers do not pay if they choose not to purchase a good, and buyers
quite often receive quantity discounts that can be either explicit or built in the
packaging of products.
The center piece of our model is the equilibrium concept of directed search,
sometimes referred to as ex ante price posting, or competitive search. This concept
has been introduced by Peters [14] and Montgomery [11], and it has been further
studied by a long list of contributors including Shimer [22], Moen [10], and
Mortensen and Wright [13]. Applied to our model of retail trade, the idea of this
equilibrium concept is that sellers post a price schedule that specifies the terms at
which they commit to trade. Buyers observe all posted price schedules and direct
their search towards the subset of sellers announcing a particular price schedule. We
refer to the set of sellers announcing a particular price schedule and the buyers that
direct their search towards them as a submarket. The assignment of buyers to sellers
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in a submarket is then dictated by an exogenous matching technology as in
Mortensen [12] and Pissarides [17]. When a buyer and a seller meet in a submarket,
the buyer chooses the quantity to be transacted and pays for it according to the price
schedule. As noted by Acemoglu and Shimer [1], this formulation of directed search
encompasses many reasonable possibilities. For example, it includes the possibility
that buyers randomly select a seller among those who post equivalent price schedules
as in the frictional assignment literature [2,14,15]. Another possibility is that
submarkets are located in separate places (malls or streets), and that in each
submarket all sellers post an identical price schedule and buyers and sellers meet
according to an exogenous matching technology.
By adopting directed search we are able to capture that in retail trade sellers use
prices to attract customers in an environment where buying and selling activities are
labor consuming and take place in bilateral meetings. Moreover, we capture that
buyers and sellers care not only about prices, but also about the expected time it
takes for them to complete a purchase. Finally, we allow for the possibility of
frictional matching between buyers and sellers.
We should clarify here the role of matching frictions in our model. Matching
frictions in our model should not be interpreted as buyers not knowing where to buy
a shirt, but rather as buyers not knowing how many other buyers are going to visit a
particular seller with a limited capacity to serve. Hence, buyers, in general, are
uncertain about the time they will spend to make a purchase, which includes the time
waiting in line to be served. Similarly, sellers are uncertain about the time they will
spend to make a sale, which includes the time they will remain idle while waiting for
a customer. Matching frictions are not necessary for our theory to be consistent and
relevant. In fact, we show that our main results continue to hold in the limiting
special case where the short side of the market is always matched (frictionless
matching). We study this special case in some detail.2 In general, we allow for
matching frictions in order to capture the uncertainty that characterizes retail
transactions, as well as to endogenize the congestion of buyers relative to sellers in
the market (i.e., the relative amounts of labor employed in buying and selling
activities). This congestion determines the trading frequencies of buyers and sellers.
An important innovation we introduce to the concept of directed search is that
sellers cannot observe the buyers’ willingness to pay (the buyers’ type). We assume
that when a buyer meets a seller, a random shock affecting the buyer’s willingness to
pay is realized. Instantly, the buyer becomes aware of his type but the seller does not.
All relevant information must then be conveyed through prices, just as in the
standard Walrasian benchmark. Introducing this form of private information in the
model allows us to generate prices that are consistent with those we typically observe
in retail trade. If the seller could observe the buyer’s type (full information), prices in
a directed search equilibrium would be type dependent. That is, prices would not be
anonymous as we typically observe in retail trade.
If the seller cannot observe the buyer’s type, the price schedule cannot be type
dependent. In this case, the equilibrium price schedule depends on the timing of the
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preference shock. If the buyer and the seller meet prior to the realization of the
preference shock, the model predicts two-tier pricing. That is, prior to the realization
of the preference shock, the seller charges a flat fee to the buyer. This flat fee covers
the labor cost of the seller. After the preference shock is realized, the buyer chooses
the quantity to be transacted and pays a price equal to the marginal cost of
production. With two-tier pricing, buyers pay the flat fee even if they purchase
minimal amounts or nothing. In retail trade, two-tier pricing is rare. Some discount
stores charge membership fees to help cover their fixed costs. However, those
instances are the exception not the rule. In our baseline model, we assume that the
preference shock is realized as soon as the buyer and the seller meet. This
assumption, combined with the fact that the buyer’s willingness to pay can be
arbitrarily low, rules out flat fees. The price paid by the buyer must then be higher
than the marginal cost of production in order to remunerate the seller’s labor.
The welfare properties of the model depend on the information available to buyers
and sellers when they trade, as well as on the timing on the preference shock. With
full information (type-dependent prices) and with private information and two-tier
pricing, the directed search equilibrium implements the first best allocation. In our
baseline model, where the two-tier pricing schedule is not feasible, the directed search
equilibrium is not efficient. In the absence of flat fees, sellers must be remunerated
through a commercial margin. The commercial margin creates a wedge between the
buyer’s willingness to pay and the marginal cost of production. This wedge reduces
the gains from trade. In addition, as long as matching is frictional, the commercial
margin in equilibrium is not large enough to generate the efficient ratio of sellers over
buyers. Consequently, the average lineup of buyers in front of a seller is inefficiently
long.
Our model can be easily incorporated in a Neoclassical growth framework with
two sectors. One of these sectors produces goods combining capital and labor as is
typical in the Neoclassical framework, while the other exchanges goods in retail
markets. The combined model can be estimated using standard empirical data. In
particular, the parameters of the retail sector can be identified and estimated using
commercial margins and the allocation of labor in the economy.3
The tractability of the model makes it suitable for further extensions. For example,
one can use this framework to introduce money along the lines of the search
theoretical approach of Kiyotaki and Wright [6,7]. Faig [4] constitutes a first attempt
in this direction in a simpler version of the present model. In this simpler version,
sellers are restricted to make offers which consist of a single quantity–payment pair.
Our main improvement with respect to Faig [4] is the relaxation of this constraint by
allowing sellers to make offers that consist of a price schedule that maps the quantity
chosen by a buyer into the payment to be made to the seller. This price schedule
serves as a mechanism to reveal the buyers’ private information about their
preferences. Also, in Faig [4] search is undirected.
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Two recent papers, Soller-Curtis and Wright [23] and Camera and Delacroix [3],
also study search-theoretic models where the buyers’ willingness to pay for a good is
private information. In both of these papers, goods are indivisible and search is
undirected. Curtis and Wright assume that sellers make take-it-or-leave-it offers to
buyers and they focus on the coexistence of two prices for the same good in
equilibrium. Camera and Delacroix focus on the endogenous determination of the
trading mechanism, that is sellers choose if they want to commit to a posted price or
to bargain once they meet a buyer. When buyers have identical preferences and
search is undirected, pre-committing to a price is preferable from the sellers point of
view because it allows them to extract the whole trading surplus. However, when the
preferences of the buyers are heterogeneous, the bargaining process allows the seller
to infer information about the buyers’ preferences and hence to price discriminate. In
our paper, goods are divisible, so sellers can commit to a non-linear price schedule
which allows a restricted form of price discrimination even without bargaining.4
Also, we incorporate the equilibrium concept of directed search which endogeneizes
the market power of sellers.
Peters and Severinov [16] also study a model of directed search where the
preferences of the buyers are private information. However, in their model the price
setting mechanism is an auction among the buyers that meet a seller. Moreover,
because a single unit is sold in each auction, their paper does not deal with the price
incentives to endogenously determine the size of each purchase.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents an overview of the model and
our equilibrium concept. Section 3 characterizes the optimal behavior of a
representative household for given prices. Section 4 studies how prices are
endogenously determined under directed search by analyzing the interaction
between buyers and sellers in the retail market. Section 5 combines the analyses of
the previous two sections into a general equilibrium model where both the behavior
of households and retail prices are endogenous. Section 6 studies the welfare
properties of a directed search equilibrium. Section 7 incorporates a generalized
version of our model in a dynamic Neoclassical growth framework and discusses
how to identify the parameters using standard data. Section 8 briefly discusses some
of the issues one must confront when extending the present model and concludes.
The proofs are gathered in the Appendix.
2. Overview of the model
The economy consists of a continuum of households with measure one who
produce and consume differentiated goods. Households do not consume the goods
they produce so they need to trade. Trading activities involve some degree of
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idiosyncratic uncertainty to be specified below. To avoid the ex post heterogeneity
induced by idiosyncratic uncertainty, which severely limits the tractability of the
model, we follow Shi [19] in assuming that each household is composed of a large
number of individuals who seek to maximize the utility of the household. These
individuals independently perform the production and exchange activities in the
household. Thanks to the large household assumption, each household faces no
uncertainty, even though the members of the household who perform trading
activities are subject to idiosyncratic risks. All members of the household equally
share the consumption of goods which is their only source of utility, so there is no
conflict of interests among them.
To construct a simple environment where households buy the goods they consume
in a retail trade sector, we make the following assumptions. Households are
uniformly distributed on the interval ½0; 1: All households are identical except that
each household produces a different divisible good. Thus, a continuum of
differentiated goods on the ½0; 1 interval are produced in the economy. Households
like to consume all goods but their own production good. Because of physical
constraints, the members of the household who perform manufacturing activities
(producers) cannot simultaneously sell the good they produce. Likewise, sellers must
remain in their retail outlets to sell their products. Therefore, for trade to take place
the buyers of a household must go around visiting sellers of other households. Since
sellers never meet each other, direct barter is ruled out.
All payments are denominated in an abstract numeraire. In the version of the
model analyzed in this paper, buyers do not need to carry money with them. Instead,
all traders have access to a central clearing-house that records the credits (payments
received by sellers) and debits (payments made by buyers) of all households and
ensures that their budget constraint is satisfied.
Trading activities are subject to two kinds of uncertainty. First, buyers some-
times find goods that, because of idiosyncratic factors, fit well the needs of
their households while in other occasions they do not. Second, because of matching
frictions, trading meetings between buyers and sellers are partially random.
Thus, a trader may or may not be able to perform a transaction during a given
period.
We model the first type of uncertainty by assuming a preference shock e that scales
the utility that a good brings to the household. Preference shocks are realized once a
buyer of the household meets a seller. Shocks are independently and identically
distributed across trading meetings, and their distribution is common knowledge.
However, the realized value of e is the buyer’s own private information. Therefore, in
a trading meeting the seller ignores the willingness to pay of the buyer. We believe
that this ignorance is key for understanding retail pricing in the same way that
unobservable characteristics of taxpayers are key for understanding income tax
schedules.
In order to model both the matching frictions and the price competition that
characterize retail markets, we assume the following form of directed search. Prior to
the trading period, each seller j simultaneously posts and commits to a price schedule
ZjðqÞ: This schedule specifies the payment required in a transaction as a function of
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the quantity exchanged.5 In the next stage, buyers observe the menu of price
schedules posted by all sellers and simultaneously choose where to shop. That is,
each buyer i decides to trade at a particular price schedule ZiðqÞ in the set of posted
schedules fZjðqÞ : for all jg: Buyers can also play mixed strategies and randomize
over price schedules for which they are indifferent. If buyer i meets a seller posting
ZiðqÞ during the trading period, the buyer privately learns the valuation e of her
household for the seller’s good, chooses the quantity to be transacted and pays for it
according to the posted price schedule. Buyers can always choose not to buy
anything in which case they pay nothing. If no meeting takes place, then there is no
trade. We refer to the set of sellers posting ZjðqÞ and the set of buyers that direct
their search to this price schedule as submarket j:
Depending on the buyers’s search decisions, there may be longer lineups in some
submarkets than in some others. To capture this, we let yjA½0;N be the ratio of
buyers to sellers in the submarket with a posted price schedule ZjðqÞ:
yj ¼ Bj
Sj
; ð1Þ
where Sj is the measure of sellers posting ZjðqÞ and Bj is the measure of buyers who
decide to trade at this price schedule. We refer to yj as the congestion in submarket j;
or the average queue of buyers in front of a seller in this submarket. For the time
being and to facilitate the exposition, we assume that buyers and sellers may perform
at most one transaction during the trading period (Section 5.2 relaxes this
assumption). In a submarket with congestion yj; the probability that a seller meets
a buyer is msðyjÞ; where ms: ½0;N-½0; 1 is continuously differentiable, increasing,
and concave. Symmetrically, a buyer meets a seller with probability mbðyjÞ; where
mb: ½0;N-½0; 1 is continuously differentiable, decreasing, and convex. If many
buyers seek a few sellers (yj is high), then it is easy for a seller to find a buyer and
hard for a buyer to find a seller. By having ms and mb depend only on yj; we
implicitly assume constant returns in matching, so
MðBj; SjÞ ¼ BjmbðyjÞ ¼ SjmsðyjÞ; ð2Þ
where M is a standard matching function that maps the measures of buyers and
sellers in submarket j onto the measure of trading meetings in this submarket (see
[17]).
An interesting special case of ms is
msðyjÞ ¼ 1 expðyjÞ: ð3Þ
This case arises if buyers use identical mixed strategies to select a seller among those
who post equivalent price offers and, because selling is time consuming, each seller
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can serve at most one customer (see [15]). This is the typical setup in the frictional
assignment literature. Another interesting special case is
msðyjÞ ¼ yj
1þ yj: ð4Þ
This special case arises if each buyer is randomly matched with a trader (buyer or
seller) in the submarket where search is directed. (In this case, msðyjÞ is equal to the
fraction of buyers over traders in submarket j). Finally, the matching technology
that arises when the search frictions vanish is: MðBj; SjÞ ¼ minfBj ; Sjg: In this case,
the short side of the market is always served:
msðyjÞ ¼ minfyj ; 1g: ð5Þ
The concept of directed search equilibrium is still well defined with this frictionless
matching technology. Our theory does not include this benchmark as a special case
because the matching technology is not differentiable. However, its analysis is similar
and in many ways simpler (see Section 5.1).
In the environment we consider, buyers and sellers are ex ante symmetric.
Given that buyers are free to choose among different price schedules, in a directed
search equilibrium, all buyers must attain the same expected payoff. Furthermore, in
equilibrium no seller should have an incentive to deviate by posting a different
price schedule. To attract buyers, the offer of the deviating seller must yield at least
the common expected payoff buyers attain in equilibrium. Therefore, in a directed
search equilibrium the price schedules and the degree of congestion associated
with them must maximize the expected payoff of sellers subject to the constraint that
the buyers get the common expected payoff. As we show in Section 4, this implies
that in our framework there is a single submarket in equilibrium. Therefore, all
transactions take place according to the same price schedule. Also, all trades face the
same congestion, so the probability of trading is the same for all buyers and all
sellers.
We proceed to develop our model with the following steps. In Sections 3–5, we
construct a static version of the model. In Section 3, we analyze the optimal behavior
of a household who takes as given the price schedule ZðqÞ and the degree of
congestion y in the market. Section 4 studies how the price schedule ZðqÞ and the
congestion y are endogenously related under directed search. Section 5 collects
the results of Sections 3 and 4 in a general equilibrium model where the behavior of
the household, the prices, and the congestion are endogenously determined.
3. A representative household
In this section, we describe the behavior of a household whose buyers and sellers
participate in a retail market with price schedule ZðqÞ and degree of congestion y:
Because there is a continuum of households in the economy, the household takes the
price schedule and the degree of congestion as given. We assume ZðqÞ to be
continuously differentiable and concave with Zð0Þ ¼ 0: The next section endogen-
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eizes ZðqÞ and validates these assumptions. Since households are symmetric, we
adopt the following notation. Lower-case letters denote the decision variables of the
household. Upper-case letters denote the decisions of the other households and
hence aggregate quantities, which are also taken as given by our household. In a
symmetric equilibrium, lower-case letters are equal to the corresponding upper-case
letters.
The household is composed of a countably infinite number of individuals. Each
household member is endowed with one unit of labor and can perform one of three
activities: production (producers), purchase (buyers), and sale of commodities
(sellers). We describe the allocation of labor in the household as the fraction of
household members assigned to each of the three activities. These fractions are
denoted by n; b; and s; respectively. The assumption that there is an infinite number
of members in the household ensures full diversification of trading risks. We assume
that this number is countable to ensure that the set of buyers in the household is of
measure zero relative to the set of goods for sale by other households. This
assumption is technically important because it implies that there are no repeated
purchases of the same good with probability one. Also, the standard Law of Large
Numbers assumes a countable infinite number of random variables.
The timing of the model is as follows. There is one period. At the beginning of the
period, the members of the household are divided into producers, buyers, and sellers.
Then, all members perform their assigned activities. Specifically, producers use their
labor to generate output, which immediately becomes available for sale. Buyers visit
sellers from other households. Upon meeting a seller, they experience a random
shock e that scales the incremental utility that the good brings to the household.
Shocks are uniformly distributed on ½0; 1 and are independent across trading
meetings. The distribution of these shocks is common knowledge, but the
realized value of e is the buyer’s own private information. Contingent on the
realized value of e; buyers choose the quantity qe they want to acquire from the seller,
and pay ze ¼ ZðqeÞ: This payment is immediately debited from the household’s
account in the clearing-house. Sellers go to retail outlets and wait for buyers to visit
them. When a seller of the household is visited by a buyer who purchases a quantity
Qe; the seller fetches this quantity from the current household production and
collects a payment Ze ¼ ZðQeÞ; which is immediately transferred to the household’s
account in the clearing-house. Finally, once all their tasks are completed, all the
individuals of the household get together and equally share the consumption of the
goods purchased.
The household’s utility is UðcÞ; where U :Rþ-R is continuously differentiable,
strictly increasing, and concave. The variable c is a hedonic measure of consumption,
which satisfies
c ¼ bmbðyÞ
Z 1
0
eq1se de
  1
1s
; sAð0; 1Þ: ð6Þ
This hedonic measure of consumption follows from a standard Dixit–Stiglitz
aggregator by applying the Law of Large Numbers. The Dixit–Stiglitz aggregator is
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defined over the set of goods purchased and consumed by the household.6 For
completeness, a detailed derivation of (6) is provided in the Appendix. The term
bmbðyÞ represents the fraction of household members who seek to buy goods from
other households and are successful in finding a seller. That is, bmbðyÞ is the number
of purchases per capita in the household. The integral
R 1
0 eq
1s
e de measures the
average contribution of a purchase. The weight associated to a purchase is eq1se ;
where e is the realization of the preference shock and qe is the quantity purchased
conditional on such a realization. Since there is a countable number of purchases, the
Law of Large Numbers implies that the ex post distribution of the realized
preference shocks is uniform on ½0; 1: The hedonic measure of consumption in (6)
implies that c doubles when qe doubles for all e; and c more than doubles when
bmbðyÞ doubles. Therefore, the household has a preference for variety, which
increases with the parameter s and vanishes when s-0: Despite the preference for
variety, the household does not buy infinitesimal amounts because it is costly to send
extra buyers to the market. To avoid dealing with uninteresting corner solutions, we
assume that U is sufficiently concave, so utility is a concave function of b:
Production (per capita) y depends on the fraction of labor employed in
manufacturing:
y ¼ f ðnÞ: ð7Þ
The production function f :Rþ-Rþ is assumed continuously differentiable, strictly
increasing, and concave. The average sales of the household are equal to the number
of sales per capita times average quantity sold in a transaction. That is, average sales
are smsðyÞ %Q where %Q ¼ R 1
0
Qe de: Since there is no aggregate uncertainty in a large
household, the amount of output both produced and sold is identical:
y ¼ smsðyÞ %Q: ð8Þ
The household must satisfy the budget constraint, that is, the average expenditure
of the household cannot exceed its average sales revenue:
smsðyÞ %Z  bmbðyÞ%zX0: ð9Þ
Here, %Z ¼ R 10 ZðQeÞ de is the average revenue of a seller who is successful in finding a
buyer, and %z ¼
R 1
0 ZðqeÞ de is the average expenditure of a buyer who is successful in
finding a seller.
The fractions of individuals assigned to the three different activities in the
household must add up to one:
b þ s þ n ¼ 1: ð10Þ
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The household chooses fqegeA½0;1; b; s; n; c and y to maximize U subject to
(6)–(10), and non-negativity constraints for all variables.7 Condition (8) can be
substituted into (7) to form a single resource constraint. Also, (6) can be substituted
into the objective function UðcÞ: Using Lagrange multipliers m; l; and W for the
resource constraint, the budget constraint, and the labor allocation constraint
respectively, the first-order conditions for an interior maximum are
U0ðcÞcseqse ¼ lZ0ðqeÞ for eA½0; 1; ð11Þ
mbðyÞ
Z 1
0
eU0ðcÞcsq1se
1 s  lze
 
de ¼ W; ð12Þ
msðyÞ
Z 1
0
ðlZe  mQeÞ de ¼ W ð13Þ
and
mf 0ðnÞ ¼ W: ð14Þ
Condition (11) states that, conditional on each possible realization e; buyers must
equate the marginal utility of purchasing an extra unit of a good with the marginal
value of the payment required in return. The other conditions imply that the value of
the marginal product of labor in all three occupations must be the same. This
common value is W: Condition (12) equates W to the expected consumer surplus
obtained by a buyer. Condition (13) equates W to the expected surplus generated by a
seller. Finally, condition (14) equates W to the value of the marginal product of labor
of a producer.
4. Commercial pricing
In this section, we describe the retail market. We model the interaction between
buyers and sellers in the marketplace in a directed search equilibrium where sellers
do not know how much buyers are willing to pay for their merchandise. A bilateral
trade is described by a pair ðq; zÞAR2þ specifying the quantity q supplied by the seller
and the payment z given in return by the buyer. In the previous section, the two
elements of this vector were linked by an exogenous price schedule z ¼ ZðqÞ: The
purpose of this section is to endogeneize Z:
The revelation principle allows us to reformulate the problem where sellers post
price schedules and buyers, with different realizations of the preference shock, self-
select along the schedule of the sellers they are matched with. Without loss of
generality, we may assume that sellers posts direct revelation mechanisms that induce
truth-telling by the buyers (that is, incentive compatible mechanisms). Feasible
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mechanisms must also satisfy the individual rationality constraints of the traders.
Buyers observe the mechanisms posted by the sellers and decide to direct their search
to those posting a particular mechanism. In a directed search equilibrium, the posted
mechanisms and the degrees of congestion associated with them must maximize the
expected payoff of the posting seller taking as given the common expected payoff
attained by the buyers. This implies that the mechanisms posted by sellers must be
optimal in the set of incentive compatible and individually rational mechanisms; that
is, any posted mechanism must be incentive efficient. Second, the equilibrium
combinations of congestion and posted mechanisms must also be efficient.
4.1. Incentive efficient direct revelation mechanisms
We begin by characterizing the set of incentive efficient direct revelation
mechanisms. That is, we characterize the direct revelation mechanisms that
maximize a weighted sum of the expected payoffs of the buyer and the seller subject
to the incentive compatibility and individual rationality constraints. We then show
that the outcome of each incentive efficient direct revelation mechanism is
implemented when sellers post a price schedule in a particular class, and buyers
who choose to trade at these prices select their most preferred price-quantity
combination depending on the realization of the preference shock.
In a meeting between a buyer and a seller, the buyer knows the realized value of e;
but the seller does not. All the seller knows is that e is a random variable uniformly
distributed on the interval ½0; 1: We refer to the realization of e as the buyer’s type.
All traders maximize the objectives of the households they belong to. Specifically,
the incremental utility of a buyer’s purchase to the household is the consumer
surplus:
Ubðq; z; eÞ ¼ ecq
1s
1 s  lz; ð15Þ
where
c  U0ðcÞcs; ð16Þ
and l is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the budget constraint (9). The
incremental utility of a seller’s sale is the (gross) commercial margin. The commercial
margin measures the spread between sales receipts and the cost of the merchandise
sold:
Usðq; zÞ ¼ lz  mq; ð17Þ
where m is the multiplier associated with the resource constraint (8). That is, Ub and
Us are defined so that they are aligned with the household’s first-order conditions
(12) and (13). By symmetry, the variables c; l; and m are identical across households.
Because each buyer and each seller are infinitesimal in the household they belong to,
they take the values of c; l; and m as given (i.e., these values are not affected by their
individual actions). For ease of exposition, we shall refer to Ub and Us as the utility
functions of buyers and sellers, respectively.
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A direct revelation mechanism is a schedule of type-contingent trades fqe; zegeA½0;1:
A direct revelation mechanism is incentive efficient if it maximizes a weighted sum of
the expected utilities of buyers and sellers:
fqe; zegeA½0;1 ¼ arg max ð1 oÞ
Z 1
0
Ubðqe; ze; eÞ deþ o
Z 1
0
Usðqe; zeÞ de
 
; ð18Þ
where oA½0; 1; subject to the following constraints:
1. Incentive compatibility: Buyers must have no incentive to lie about their type:
e0Aarg max
eA½0;1
½Ubðqe; ze; e0Þ for all e0A½0; 1: ð19Þ
2. Individual rationality: Buyers and sellers must receive non-negative utility in all
meetings:8
Ubðqe; ze; eÞX0 for all eA½0; 1 ð20Þ
and
Us qe; zeð ÞX0 for all eA½0; 1: ð21Þ
In the Appendix, we use standard arguments in the mechanism design literature to
characterize the set of incentive efficient direct revelation mechanisms. This
characterization is summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition 1. The incentive efficient direct revelation mechanisms which solve
program (18) subject to (19)–(21), are the following:
qe ¼
0 for eA½0; gÞ
c
m
e g
1 g
 1
s
for eA½g; 1;
8><
>: and ð22Þ
ze ¼ 1l g
cq1se
1 s þ ð1 gÞmqe
 
; ð23Þ
where
g ¼
0 for oA½0; 0:5Þ;
2o 1
3o 1 for oA½0:5; 1:
8<
: ð24Þ
ARTICLE IN PRESS
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their variety for sale, then they could demand a payment from the buyers to reveal this information. In this
case, buyers could end up with negative utility in some meetings.
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The following proposition establishes that the outcome of an incentive efficient
direct revelation mechanism is implemented when sellers post a simple non-linear
price schedule and buyers optimally choose the quantity they want to acquire at
these prices.
Proposition 2. The outcome of an incentive efficient direct revelation mechanism is
attained when buyers choose q facing the following price schedule:
ZðqÞ ¼ 1
l
g
cq1s
1 s þ ð1 gÞmq
 
; ð25Þ
where gA½0; 0:5 satisfies (24). We refer to a schedule with parameter g as the price
schedule g:
As long as commercial margins are positive ðg40Þ; the pricing schedule ZðqÞ is
strictly concave. This concavity implies that the per unit price of goods declines with
q; or equivalently that buyers obtain quantity discounts. This is not unrealistic. In
retail trade, sometimes we observe explicit quantity discounts, but most often
quantity discounts are implicit in the packaging of products (the larger is the box of
nails, the lower is the per unit price).
When buyers have full market power, that is when o ¼ 0; prices cover only the
marginal cost of production ðg ¼ 0Þ: In this case, buyers capture the whole trading
surplus and the individual rationality constraint of the seller binds. This constraint
continues to bind as long as op0:5: For o40:5; commercial margins are positive
and both the buyer and the seller appropriate a fraction of the trading surplus. Even
when sellers have full market power, that is when o ¼ 1 and g ¼ 0:5; they are not
able to extract the whole trading surplus because they do not know their clients’
type.9 For op0:5; the buyers’ incentive compatibility constraints are not binding.
Hence, when g ¼ 0; the incentive efficient direct revelation mechanism characterized
in Proposition 1 maximizes the gains from trade under full information (i.e., the
mechanism is first best efficient).10 However, for o40:5; the buyers’ incentive
compatibility constraints bind and the gains from trade are lower than under full
information. Thus, unless buyers appropriate the whole trading surplus, the trading
surplus will be lower than under full information. In our model, buyers cannot
ARTICLE IN PRESS
9The case where g ¼ 0:5 is an interesting benchmark, which we denote monopolistic search. With
monopolistic search, sellers post the prices that maximize their expected profits in an environment where
their price schedules have no effect on the number of clients visiting their outlets. This might be the
relevant equilibrium concept for some tourist areas where buyers have little knowledge about where to
shop. However, in most commercial areas, sellers are aware that they can attract buyers to their outlets by
posting low prices.
10Since the preferences of buyers and sellers are quasilinear, the (expected) gains from trade in a match
are Z 1
0
Ubðqe; ze; eÞ deþ
Z 1
0
Usðqe; zeÞ de ¼
Z 1
0
ecq1se
1 s  mqqe
 
de:
When g ¼ 0; the quantities in (22) maximize this function.
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appropriate the whole trading surplus in equilibrium because there would be no
sellers (see Section 5).
4.2. Trade-off between prices and congestion
Let Vbðyj ; gjÞ and Vsðyj; gjÞ respectively be the expected utility of buyers and sellers
in a submarket with congestion yj and price schedule gj:
Vbðyj; gjÞ ¼ mbðyjÞ
Z 1
0
ecq1se
1 s  lze
 
de ð26Þ
and
Vsðyj; gjÞ ¼ msðyjÞ
Z 1
0
lze  mqeð Þ de; ð27Þ
where qe and ze are given by (22) and (23). Integrating these expressions we obtain
Vbðyj; gjÞ ¼ mbðyjÞ
s2
1 s2c
1
sm
s1
s ð1 gjÞ2 ð28Þ
and
Vsðyj; gjÞ ¼ msðyjÞ
2s2
1 s2c
1
sm
s1
s gjð1 gjÞ: ð29Þ
In a directed search equilibrium, Vb must be common to all active submarkets,
because buyers are free to choose the submarket where they direct their search. Also,
the pair ðyj; gjÞ must maximize Vsðyj; gjÞ subject to the constraint that Vbðyj; gjÞ is
equal to the common expected utility attained by buyers in all active submarkets.
The solution to this maximization problem, if one exists, is unique.11 Hence, there is
a unique submarket in a directed search equilibrium, and the subscript j can be
omitted. This is consistent with our assumptions in Section 3: when all households
behave identically, all traders face the same prices and the same congestion. Also, as
long as sellers capture a fraction of the expected trading surplus, the equilibrium pair
ðy; gÞ is interior and satisfies the following first-order condition:
@Vbðy;gÞ
@y
@Vbðy;gÞ
@g
¼
@Vsðy;gÞ
@y
@Vsðy;gÞ
@g
: ð30Þ
That is, buyers and sellers must have a common marginal rate of substitution of y
for g: Differentiating (28) and (29) and substituting into (30), we obtain
g ¼ 1 ZðyÞ
2
; ð31Þ
ARTICLE IN PRESS
11Substituting the constraint in the objective function and dropping unnecessary constants, yj must
maximize the strictly concave function: msðyjÞf1 ½vmbðyjÞ0:5g½vmbðyjÞ0:5; where v is a constant
inversely proportional to the given value for Vb:
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where ZðyÞ is the elasticity of the function ms:
ZðyÞ ¼ m
s0ðyÞy
msðyÞ : ð32Þ
Eq. (31) shows that the price schedule and the congestion level are endogenously
related in a directed search equilibrium. The term 1 ZðyÞ measures the contribution
of sellers in the matching process. As long as the elasticity function ZðyÞ is
decreasing, this contribution is increases with the congestion y: Eq. (31) says that the
higher this contribution, the higher the fraction of the surplus appropriated by
the seller in a directed search equilibrium. In the next section, we pinpoint the
equilibrium pair ðy; gÞ by combining the endogenous relation in Eq. (31) with
the optimal choice of the fractions of buyers and sellers in each household.
5. General equilibrium
In this section, we characterize a directed search equilibrium by combining the
optimal behavior of households in Section 3 with the endogenous determination of
the price schedule in Section 4.
Definition. The tuple fn; b; s; c; y; qe; ze;c; m; l;ZðqÞ; yg is a symmetric directed
search equilibrium if
1. All households choose fn; b; s; c; y; qeg to solve their optimization problem
taking as given the price schedule ZðqÞ; the market congestion ratio y and the
decisions of other households, and the households’ implied payments are ze ¼ ZðqeÞ:
2. The payment schedule ZðqÞ satisfies (25) when c satisfies (16) and m and l are
the Lagrange multipliers associated with the resource constraint and the budget
constraint in the household’s optimization problem.
3. The pair ðg; yÞ satisfies condition (31).
4. The market congestion ratio is consistent with individual behavior: y ¼ b=s:
Since in a symmetric directed search equilibrium all households behave identically,
lower-case and upper-case letters coincide. Symmetry and the equilibrium condition
4, together with constraints (2) and (8), imply that the amount of each good that is
produced and traded in equilibrium satisfies:
y ¼ f ðnÞ ¼ smsðb=sÞ %q ¼ bmbðb=sÞ %q; ð33Þ
where smsðb=sÞ (equivalently, bmbðb=sÞÞ is the number of sales per capita in each
household, and %q ¼
R 1
0
qede is the average quantity of output sold in a transaction.
In equilibrium, a household must obtain the same utility from allocating an
individual to any of the three activities, as it is implied by the first-order conditions
(12)–(14). Therefore, Vbðy; gÞ and Vsðy; gÞ must be equal. Using (28) and (29)
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together with (2), this equality implies
y ¼ 1 g
2g
: ð34Þ
According to (34), the congestion of buyers in the market y is inversely related to g:
As g increases buyers capture a smaller fraction of the trade surplus (see Proposition
2), so households respond by sending fewer buyers and more sellers to the
marketplace. Combining (34) with condition (31), we obtain the pair ðy; gÞ: In
particular, congestion y is implicitly determined by the following equation:
1
1
2
þ y ¼ 1 ZðyÞ: ð35Þ
Consequently, the equality of expected payoffs of buyers and sellers, Vbðy; gÞ ¼
V sðy; gÞ; together with the common marginal rate of substitution of y for g by buyers
and sellers determine the two key variables in the retail sector: the congestion y and
the price schedule g:
To determine the remaining variables in the model, we must combine the resource
constraints, the household’s first-order conditions, and the definitions of y; c; and c:
Equating Vsðy; gÞ to the marginal payoff of a producer, mf 0ðnÞ; we obtain
f 0ðnÞ ¼ msðyÞ 2s
2
1 s2
c
m
 1
s
gð1 gÞ: ð36Þ
Integrating the quantities traded when buyers face a price schedule g which are given
by (22), we obtain the average quantity sold in a trading meeting
%q ¼ s
1þ s
c
m
 1
sð1 gÞ: ð37Þ
Combining (7), (8), (36), and (37) gives
f 0ðnÞ
f ðnÞ ¼
2s
1 s
g
s
: ð38Þ
Using the equilibrium condition y ¼ b=s; and the labor resource constraint (10),
we have
s ¼ 1 n
1þ y: ð39Þ
Finally, combining (38) with (39) and using (34), we obtain
ð1 nÞf 0ðnÞ
f ðnÞ ¼
sð1þ gÞ
1 s : ð40Þ
Eq. (40) determines n for a given value of g: In a directed search equilibrium, g and y
are obtained from (31) and (35). Given y; g; and n; the equilibrium values for s; b;
c=m; qe; c; y; c; and m are recursively determined by (38), (1), (36), (22), (6), (7), (16),
and (36). The utility value of the payment schedule lZðqÞ is determined by (25), but
the precise values of l and ZðqÞ are indeterminate because they depend on the units
in which payments are measured.
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The following proposition summarizes the conditions for the existence and
uniqueness of a directed search equilibrium (the proof is in the Appendix):
Proposition 3. If the elasticity ZðyÞ is non-increasing and belongs to the interval ð0; 1Þ;
and the following terminal conditions are satisfied: f ð0Þ ¼ 0 and f 0ð0Þ40; then a
directed search equilibrium exists and is unique.12
Under the assumptions in Proposition 3, the left-hand side of (40) is a decreasing
function of n: Therefore, the equilibrium amount of labor allocated to production is
inversely related to the preference for diversity, measured by s; and prices, measured
by g: A higher preference for diversity means that households are more willing to
sacrifice labor to shop for a diverse basket of goods. Likewise, higher prices mean
that households find it in their interest to allocate more labor to sell goods.
Therefore, both a higher s and a higher g divert labor from production to trading
activities. In our model, the value of g is endogenous. As stated in (31) g is increasing
with 1 ZðyÞ with y determined in (35). Therefore, the value of n is inversely related
to the equilibrium contribution of sellers in the matching process measured by the
term 1 ZðyÞ:
To calculate the average commercial margin in a directed search equilibrium, we
use (22) to obtain the following relationship:
c
Z 1
0
eq1se de ¼ ð1þ gsÞm %q: ð41Þ
Substituting (41) and (34) into (12) and (13), we get
2g
1 g
1þ gs
1 s m %q  l%z
 
¼ l%z  m %q: ð42Þ
Using (42), we obtain that the average commercial mark-up (ratio of the average
commercial margin in the retail sector over the production cost of the merchandise):
l%z  m %q
m %q
¼ s
1 s ½1 ZðyÞ: ð43Þ
The average commercial mark-up provides a measure of the size of retailing relative
to manufacturing because it is the ratio of the value added in these two sectors.
Eq. (43) says that the value added of retailing relative to manufacturing increases
with both the contribution of sellers in the matching process measured by 1 ZðyÞ;
and the preference for diversity s: The higher the sellers’ contribution in the
matching process 1 ZðyÞ; the higher the value added by any one seller in the retail
sector. A higher preference for diversity s raises the households’ willingness to
allocate their labor to buying in order to acquire a diverse basket of goods. An
increase in the number of buyers reduces the search costs of sellers and raises the
value added of a seller in the retail sector.
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5.1. Special case: frictionless matching
With a frictionless matching technology MðB; SÞ ¼ minfB; Sg; the characteriza-
tion of the directed search equilibrium is identical except for the trade-off between
the congestion and the price schedule. To maximize the expected utility of the
seller in Eq. (29) subject to the constraint that the expected utility of the buyer in
Eq. (28) is constant, we must set y ¼ 1: Therefore, in equilibrium B ¼ S; so all buyers
and all sellers are matched with probability one. Eq. (31) is no longer relevant, and
Eq. (34) implies g ¼ 1=3: Eq. (40) still determines the value of n once we set g ¼ 1=3:
Likewise, given y; g; and n; the equilibrium values for s and b (which are identical),
c=m; qe; c; y; c; and m are still determined recursively using (39), (36), (22), (6), (7),
(16), and (36). Moreover, the exact same argument used in the proof of Proposition 3
implies that a directed search equilibrium exists and is unique if f ð0Þ ¼ 0 and
f 0ð0Þ40:
If matching technology is frictionless, the average commercial mark-up is
l%z  m %q
m %q
¼ 2
3
s
1 s: ð44Þ
As in the previous section, the average commercial mark-up increases with the
preference for diversity s: However, the average commercial mark-up is not affected
by search costs since sellers trade with probability one.
In Section 6, we study the efficiency properties of the directed search
equilibrium allocation. Most qualitative results in Section 6 hold whether
or not matching frictions are present. Our main result is that the directed
search equilibrium is inefficient. The effect of matching frictions is to distort
the directed search equilibrium allocation further away from the first best
allocation.
5.2. Multiple matches
In our model, there is no logical reason to restrict buyers and sellers to at most one
match in the trading period. The extension to multiple matches is straightforward for
the following reasons. Individual traders (buyers or sellers) are infinitesimal in the
household where they belong, so their individual actions have no effect on the
shadow valuations of goods, labor, and payments in the household: c; m; and l:
Moreover, thanks to the clearing-payments mechanism, an individual buyer is
not restricted by the money he or she carries. Likewise, thanks to the immediate
access to current production, an individual seller is not restricted by available
commercial inventories. Therefore, the optimal strategies of buyers and sellers in
successive trading meetings do not depend on their individual histories. Our analysis
and results apply with almost no modification to a generalized model where
buyers and sellers can perform multiple matches during the trading period. In
that model, we reinterpret msðyÞ and mbðyÞ as the expected number of trading
matches that a seller and a buyer perform during the trading period, respectively.
With this reinterpretation, the image of these two functions is ½0;NÞ instead of
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½0; 1:13 Conveniently, this allows for a Cobb–Douglas matching technology for
which the elasticity of msðyÞ is a constant.
6. Welfare
This section studies the welfare properties of the directed search equilibrium. To
this end, it characterizes the optimal allocation that a benevolent central planner
would choose in order to maximize the utility of a representative household.
Following standard practice, the central planner is not only bound by the resources
available in the economy, but also by the bilateral matching among traders. In
addition, it is sensible that we restrict the central planner to information that is
publicly available. However, imposing this restriction is much more subtle than it
first appears. The incentive compatibility constraint (19) arising from the fact that
the buyers’ types are private information is only binding when selling costs must be
financed with the revenue from sales (see below). Moreover, the central planner can
easily affect this revenue with policy tools that, in principle, are respectful to private
information, for example, a sales tax or a sales subsidy. Due to the subtleties of
restricting the central planner to public information, we start by characterizing the
first best allocation, in which the central planner is not bound by the incentive
compatibility constraints imposed by private information. This allocation is an
interesting benchmark in itself and is useful to evaluate the welfare costs of private
information. Later, we introduce private information with specific assumptions
about the policy tools at the disposal of the central planner.
6.1. The optimum with complete information
The first best allocation is one in which the central planner maximizes the utility of
a representative household subject to the resources available in the economy and the
bilateral matching among traders. Let Mðb; sÞ be the aggregate matching function,
that is Mðb; sÞ ¼ bmbðb=sÞ ¼ smsðb=sÞ: The planner must solve the following
program:
max
b;s;n;qe
UðcÞ; where c ¼ Mðb; sÞ
Z 1
0
eq1se de
  1
1s
; ð45Þ
where subject to (10) and
Mðb; sÞ
Z 1
0
qede ¼ f ðnÞ: ð46Þ
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The first-order conditions of this problem are
ecqse ¼ m; ð47Þ
Mbðb; sÞ
Z 1
0
ecq1se
1 s de mMbðb; sÞ
Z 1
0
qede ¼ mf 0ðnÞ; ð48Þ
Msðb; sÞ
Z 1
0
ecq1se
1 s de mMsðb; sÞ
Z 1
0
qe de ¼ mf 0ðnÞ; ð49Þ
where m is the Lagrange multiplier of (46) and c ¼ U0ðcÞcs: In the first best, the
marginal utility of consuming each good must be equal to the marginal cost of
production. Also, the marginal social benefit of employment in all three activities
must be the same. Comparing (48) and (49), we obtain
Mbðb; sÞ ¼ Msðb; sÞ: ð50Þ
Equality (50) implies that for a given number of traders the number of
trading meetings is maximized. Eqs. (10) and (46) to (49) can be easily manipulated
to obtain an almost explicit solution of the first best allocation (see the Appendix for
details):
Proposition 4. The first best allocation, in which the central planner has both
complete information and control over all variables, is characterized by the following
equations:
1
1þ y ¼ 1 ZðyÞ; ð51Þ
ð1 nÞf 0ðnÞ
f ðnÞ ¼
s
1 s; ð52Þ
s ¼ 1 n
1þ y; ð53Þ
b ¼ ys ð54Þ
and
qe ¼ 1þ ss
f ðnÞ
Mðb; sÞ e
1
s: ð55Þ
The following proposition compares the allocations in the first best and in the
directed search equilibrium. The proposition shows that congestion is higher and
production is lower in equilibrium than in the first best. To facilitate comparison of
other variables, the proposition specializes the production and matching technol-
ogies to standard functional forms:
Proposition 5. Suppose that all the assumptions used in Proposition 3 to ensure
existence and uniqueness of an equilibrium hold. Let an asterisk denote first best and no
ARTICLE IN PRESS
M. Faig, B. Jerez / Journal of Economic Theory 122 (2005) 60–9980
21
asterisk denote directed search equilibrium. The following relations hold:
y4y; ð56Þ
non: ð57Þ
In addition, if f is isoelastic,
s
n
X
s
n
; with equality if ZðyÞ is constant: ð58Þ
Finally, if f is constant returns to scale,
%qo %q: ð59Þ
In a directed search equilibrium, selling costs are financed with commercial
margins that create a wedge between the marginal cost of production of
merchandises and the price paid by buyers. This wedge reduces the quantities that
buyers purchase in each transaction for given valuations of goods and labor c and m
(compare (22) and (47)). However, ex ante price competition among sellers narrows
commercial margins so the congestion of buyers to sellers in equilibrium is higher
than in the first best. Intuitively, the equilibrium price schedule must play two
conflicting allocational roles: It must signal buyers the opportunity cost of the goods
they intend to purchase, and it must finance retail costs in order to induce an efficient
ratio of sellers over buyers. The equilibrium price schedule settles on a compromise
between these two roles. Prices are higher than the social opportunity cost of goods
but not high enough to finance the first best ratio of sellers over buyers. Even though,
commercial margins induce buyers to purchase smaller quantities, the comparison
between qe and q

e is ambiguous because the equilibrium and the first best assign a
different shadow value to the cost of production relative to the utility of
consumption ðm=cÞ: In the special case where f is constant returns to scale, we
can prove that on average buyers purchase an inefficiently low quantity when they
meet a seller.
In the baseline case where both f and ms are isoelastic, the ratio ðs=nÞ is identical
in the equilibrium and the first best allocations. Therefore, in this baseline case the
inefficiently high ðb=sÞ ratio implies that in equilibrium the measure of buyers is
inefficiently high and the measures of sellers and producers are inefficiently low. In
general, the equilibrium allocation of labor relative to the first best depends on
whether the elasticities of f and ms are increasing or decreasing with respect to n and
y; respectively.
The following proposition compares the allocations in the first best and in the
directed search equilibrium when the matching technology is frictionless. With this
matching technology, the planner always chooses y ¼ 1: Eqs. (52)–(55) still
characterize the first best allocation once we set y ¼ 1 and Mðb; sÞ ¼ b ¼ s:
Proposition 6 shows that in equilibrium the congestion is efficient, but the
production is still lower than in the first best.
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Proposition 6. Suppose that the matching function is efficient and that the assumptions
on f used in Proposition 3 hold (so a unique directed search equilibrium exists). Let an
asterisk denote first best and no asterisk denote directed search equilibrium. The
following relations hold:
y ¼ y ¼ 1; ð60Þ
non; ð61Þ
b ¼ s4b ¼ s; ð62Þ
%qo %q: ð63Þ
When the matching technology is efficient, the equilibrium price schedule induces
an efficient ratio of sellers over buyers, but prices are still higher than the marginal
cost of production. On average buyers purchase an inefficiently low quantity when
they meet a seller. Even though the ratio ðb=sÞ is efficient, in equilibrium there are
too many buyers and sellers performing transactions that are too small. As a result,
whether of not matching frictions are present, the relative amount of labor allocated
to production relative to selling is inefficiently low.
As in Moen [10] and Shimer [22], the first best allocation can be implemented as a
directed search equilibrium when buyers and sellers have complete information. In
this case, a bilateral trade must maximize the joint surplus of buyers and sellers.
Moreover, the ex ante price competition among sellers leads to sharing this surplus
according to Hosios’s [5] rule, that is buyers get a fraction ZðyÞ of the surplus and
sellers get 1 ZðyÞ; and y is the first best level of congestion. With private
information about buyers’ types, this equilibrium breaks down because the incentive
compatibility constraint (19) is violated.
The first best allocation can be decentralized as a directed search equilibrium
where buyers’ types are private information if sellers can charge a flat fee to
prospective buyers prior to the realization of the preference shock e: In this case, the
flat fee covers selling costs without having to add a positive commercial margin on
the price of merchandises. In our model, such a fee is prevented by the assumption
that buyers get the preference shock as soon as they meet a seller, so a buyer is not
willing to pay the fee if the realization of e is low. That is, flat fees violate the
individual rationality constraint of buyers. More generally, one could realistically
assume that the buyers’ satisfaction from a commercial transaction depends on the
service effort provided by the seller. In this more complicated model, the flat
unconditional fee is also discouraged by the moral hazard problem it generates on
the effort exercised by sellers. In reality, we find flat fees in warehouse clubs.
However, sales in warehouse clubs are a small fraction of the economy-wide retail
sales, and even these clubs charge fees that cover a small fraction of their commercial
costs.
The following proposition summarizes these two ways of decentralizing the first
best allocation:
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Proposition 7. The first best allocation where the planner has complete information can
be implemented as a directed search equilibrium if buyers and sellers have complete
information or if sellers can charge a flat fee to prospective buyers prior to the
realization of the preference shock e:
6.2. The optimum with private information
This subsection characterizes second best allocations when the central planner has
limited information. Given that buyers’ types are private information it is natural to
assume that the central planner cannot directly observe them. However, if the central
planner can monitor the allocation of labor in each household, then the first best
allocation can be easily implemented by dictating to households the allocation of
labor, charging buyers the marginal cost of producing merchandise, and transferring
the proceeds of these payments to sellers. With this mechanism, buyers truthfully
reveal their types without any efficiency loss. To make our analysis more realistic and
more interesting than this simple result, we assume that the central planner cannot
directly observe how households allocate their labor. This assumption is in line with
the unobservability of leisure (and so the allocation of time when there are two
activities) in the standard theory of taxation.
Specifically, we assume that the planner can only observe market transactions and
only has control of the direct revelation mechanisms by which transactions are
conducted, or equivalently the price schedules faced by buyers and sellers. Given these
price schedules, buyers choose the quantities they want to purchase, which sellers supply
as long as prices are above the marginal costs of production. Households decide the
allocation of labor taking into account the expected returns from each activity.
In principle, buyers and sellers could face different price schedules. If so, the gap
between the two schedules is a sales tax (or a sales subsidy) to be collected (or
distributed) by a government who balances its budget with a lump-sum subsidy (or a
lump-sum tax) on households. In the two propositions that follow, we make
alternative assumptions on the central planner’s ability to control the pricing
mechanism and to impose lump-sum taxes on households.
In the absence of any restriction on these policy instruments, the central planner
can implement the first best allocation despite the presence of private information:
Proposition 8. If the central planner can resort to lump-sum taxes on households to
finance a linear sales subsidy, then the first best allocation characterized in Proposi-
tion 4 can be decentralized with the following price schedule faced by buyers:
ZðqÞ ¼ ZðyÞmq
l
; ð64Þ
and a linear sales subsidy at the gross rate:
T ¼ 1 sZðyÞð1 sÞZðyÞ; ð65Þ
where y is the solution to (51). (The price schedule faced by sellers is TZðqÞ).
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This proposition implies that the planner could not do better by introducing
additional control instruments. Intuitively, the proposition holds because the
planner picks the tab for the selling costs with the sales subsidy. Hence, the prices
faced by the buyers can be equated to the marginal social cost of production of
merchandises.
The implementation of the first best allocation in Proposition 8 depends on the
existence of lump-sum taxes. In the model, this is not problematic because all
households are identical. However, this homogeneity is unrealistic and has been
assumed only for simplicity. The next proposition assumes the absence of lump-sum
taxes.
Proposition 9. If the only policy instrument is to set the retail trade price schedule and
the marginal product of labor is constant (the production function is affine), a directed
search equilibrium is efficient.
If the production function is affine, a central planner without recourse to lump-
sum taxes cannot improve upon the directed search equilibrium. When the
production function is not affine, regulation of the price schedule can be welfare
enhancing because it has an indirect effect on the marginal product of labor which
differs from its first best value. However, as long as the production function is
differentiable, it can always be approximated with an affine production function, and
so the welfare gains of deviating from the directed search equilibrium are second
order of magnitude. In the next section, we use numerical simulations to check that
these welfare gains are very small.
7. Commerce in a Neoclassical growth framework
This section sketches how to embed the model developed in the previous sections
in a Neoclassical growth framework. In the extended model, time is infinite and
discrete. Each period in the life of a household proceeds as in the static model. Also,
in the resulting synthesis, the economy has two sectors: one produces goods
combining capital and labor as in the Neoclassical growth model, the other
exchanges goods in directed search markets where buyers’ types are private
information. To make our model as close as possible to the basic Neoclassical
growth model, we assume that investment does not require installation or
commercial costs. However, future work could incorporate these features. For
brevity, we omit all proofs, which are either standard in the Neoclassical growth
theory or parallel the arguments in the previous sections.
The household’s intertemporal utility function is
XN
t¼0
btUðctÞ; ð66Þ
where bAð0; 1Þ is the household’s discount factor.
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Also, the production of goods requires not only labor but also capital:
yt ¼ Fðkt; ntÞ: ð67Þ
The production function F :R2þ-Rþ maps capital and labor into output. This
function is continuously differentiable, increasing in both arguments, concave, and
homogeneous of degree one. Also, the Inada conditions for an interior solution are
assumed to apply.
Goods can be used for both consumption and investment. When goods are used
for consumption, they are exchanged in the same type of markets as those described
in the previous sections. Goods used for consumption are perishable and must be
sold in the same period in which they are produced. Goods are used for investment
are perfect substitutes for one another. To save commercial costs, households use
part of their own output to increase their capital stock. Therefore, households
allocate a fraction of their output to be sold and another fraction to investment:
yt ¼ ktþ1  ktð1 dÞ þ stmsðytÞqt; ð68Þ
where dAð0; 1Þ is the depreciation rate. The fraction destined for sale is consumed by
the purchasing households.
Each period t the household is subject to constraints (6), (9) to (10), (67) and
(68).14 The problem of the household is to choose fqetgeA½0;1; bt; st; nt; ct; yt and ktþ1
to maximize (66) subject to this system of constraints. We use Lagrange multipliers
btmt; b
tlt; and b
tWt for the resource constraint, the budget constraint, and the labor
allocation constraint, respectively. Then, the optimal behavior of a household is
characterized by the same first-order conditions as those in Section 3, that is
(11)–(14), with all variables indexed by the corresponding time subscript, and the
obvious modification that output and the marginal product of labor now depend on
the capital stock. Moreover, the following two conditions must hold:
mt ¼ mtþ1½F kðktþ1; ntþ1Þ þ 1 db; ð69Þ
and
lim
t-N
btmtkt ¼ 0: ð70Þ
Eq. (69) states that the value of one unit of output today is equal to the present
discounted value of the gross marginal product of capital, while Eq. (70) is a
standard transversality condition.
A directed search equilibrium is a set fnt; bt; st; ct; yt; ktþ1; qet; zet;ct; mt; lt;
ZtðqÞ; ytgNt¼0 satisfying conditions analogous to the ones in the definition in Sec-
tion 5. This equilibrium is now described by a system of difference equations for the
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exposition by assuming that the balance of credits and debits for each household must be zero in each
period.
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variables kt and mt: (68) and (69) together with the time-indexed versions of
conditions (1), (10), (16), (22), (31), (34), (36),15 (37), (39), and (67). This system
together with the initial condition k0 and the terminal condition (70) determines the
equilibrium path. For all capital stocks, Eqs. (31) and (34) still determine the pricing
parameter gt and the congestion yt of buyers over sellers in the market for
consumption goods. Therefore, these two variables are constant along an
equilibrium path.
Qualitatively, the dynamics of capital accumulation are identical to those of the
Neoclassical growth model. Capital converges monotonically to a steady state where
kt and mt are constant. For low capital stocks, both the marginal product of capital
and the utility price of capital mt are high relative to the steady state. High levels of mt
induce low consumption and as a result high saving. As capital is accumulated,
households not only increase the fraction of output allocated to consumption, but
also the fraction of labor allocated to the exchange of commodities.
In the steady state, Eq. (69) implies that the net marginal product of capital is
equal to the subjective discount rate:
F k k
n
; 1
 
 d ¼ 1
b
 1: ð71Þ
When net investment is zero, analogous steps to the derivation of (40) yield:
F nðkn; 1Þ
Fðk
n
; 1Þ  d k
n
1 n
n
¼ sð1þ gÞ
1 s : ð72Þ
Eqs. (71) and (72) determine the steady-state capital stock and labor allocated into
production. The steady-state values of the remaining variables (b; s; qe; and m) are
obtained from equations analogous to those in Section 5.
As in the version of the model without capital, a central planner who faces the
same informational constraints as the market and who only has control of the direct
revelation mechanism by which transactions are conducted cannot improve upon the
directed search equilibrium allocation when the production technology is linear.
With the existence of capital, constant returns to scale does not imply that the
production technology is linear. However, with constant returns to scale the
difference in welfare between a directed search equilibrium and the allocation that is
attained when the central planner chooses the direct revelation mechanism are
negligible for reasonable parameters (see the numerical example in the following
subsection).
As in the Neoclassical growth model, output and capital converge to a steady
growth path if the utility function U is isoelastic and the efficiency of labor in the
production of goods grows at a constant rate. Also, the utility function can be easily
extended to include leisure or home services. In this case, the restrictions on U for
convergence to a steady growth path are the standard ones.
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7.1. Numerical calibration
In the context of the Neoclassical growth framework, our model of commerce can
be estimated using standard economic data. In this subsection, we discuss how to
identify the parameters of the model, and we provide a numerical calibration of the
model. For this purpose, we assume logarithmic preferences: UðctÞ ¼ ln ct;16 and
Cobb–Douglas matching and production technologies: Mðbt; stÞ ¼ A0bZt s1Zt and
Fðkt; etntÞ ¼ A1kat ðetntÞ1a: (The functional form of the matching technology could
be estimated with data on the distributions of idle serving spells by sellers and of
waiting times to be served by buyers, but we leave this empirical work for future
research.) We also assume that the efficiency of labor in the production of goods (etÞ
grows at a constant rate g:
As is standard in the Neoclassical growth model, the parameters a; b; d; and g can
be estimated using capital and labor income shares in the sector producing goods,
the real return on capital, the durability of capital, and the average growth rate of
output. In our numerical example in Table 1, we pick standard estimates for these
parameters. The two remaining parameters of the model to estimate are the
preference for diversity ðsÞ and the elasticity of matches with respect to the number
of sellers ðZÞ: (The values of A0 and A1 just reflect the units of measurement and are
irrelevant for all the calculations that follow.) These two parameters can be identified
with empirical estimates of the average commercial mark-up and the congestion in
the retail sector. In a directed search equilibrium, Eqs. (31), (35), and (43) imply:
Average commercial mark-up
ltzt  mtqt
mtqt
 
¼ sð1 ZÞ
1 s ð73Þ
and
Congestion
bt
st
 
¼ 1þ Z
2ð1 ZÞ: ð74Þ
Therefore, with estimates of the average commercial mark-up and market congestion
we can solve for s and Z:
The Bureau of the Census of the United States reports that the average
commercial margin over sales for retail trade has quite stable around 0.28 during the
last decade.17 This implies that the average commercial mark-up is approximately
0:39 (i.e., 0:39 is approximately equal to 0:28=ð1 0:28Þ). The Bureau of Labor
Statistics measures the number of production employees in retail trade and the
average weekly hours that these employees work. The product of these two measures
ARTICLE IN PRESS
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equilibrium is greatly simplified because then stm
sðytÞqt ¼ ð1þ sgÞ1m1t :
17See http://www.census.gov/svsd/www/artstbl.html. The commercial margin over sales varies widely
by the type of business of the retailers. For example, in 2000, at the lower end, we find the commercial
margins for Warehouse Clubs and Superstores (0.167), Automotive Dealers (0.175), and Gasoline Stations
(0.208). At the upper end, we have the margins for Specialty Food Stores (0.419), Clothing and Footwear
(0.426), and Furniture (0.441). In this paper we abstract from the reasons why different goods may trade
with different margins, although this is an interesting topic for future research.
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is the empirical counterpart of st (465 million hours/week in 1986).
18 To calculate bt;
we multiply the average time spent shopping by an adult (3.4 h/week in 1986)
reported in Robinson et al. [18, p. 84]19 by the number of shoppers in the economy
(United States population 16 and over). This product measures the empirical
counterpart of bt (630 million hours/week in 1986). This implies that congestion is
1.35 ðC630=465Þ: Applying these estimates to the system (73) and (74), we obtain
Z ¼ 0:46 and s ¼ 0:42:
Using the estimated parameters, Table 1 compares the directed search equilibrium
and the first best allocation. These calculations use the formulas described in
previous sections for the balance growth paths and use numerical methods for the
transitional dynamics necessary to calculate the last row of the Table. In equilibrium,
households spend less time producing and selling goods and more time shopping
than in the first best. Also, in equilibrium buyers leave empty handed from 27
percent of the trading meetings while they always acquire a positive amount of goods
in the first best. Welfare in the two allocations is quite different. Changing from the
first best balanced path to the equilibrium balanced path is equivalent to a 7.94
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Table 1
Numerical example
Production function: Fðk; enÞ ¼ A1kaðenÞ1a; a ¼ 0:36
Depreciation rate: 0:1
Rate of interest: r ¼ 0:04
Rate of growth of e: g ¼ 0:018
Discount factor: b ¼ ð1þ gÞ=ð1þ rÞ
One period utility: lnðcÞ
Preference for diversity: s ¼ 0:42
Matching technology: Mðb; sÞ ¼ A0bZs1Z; Z ¼ 0:46:
Directed search equilibrium First best allocation
Balanced growth path
Producers ðnÞ 0.500 0.559
Sellers ðsÞ 0.213 0.237
Buyers ðbÞ 0.287 0.203
Capital/labor ratio ðk=nÞ 4.374 4.374
Pricing weight parameter ðgÞ 0.270 0
Quantity purchased when eXgðqeÞ 11.23(1.37e0.37)2.38 10.13e2.38
Welfare relative to the first best (equivalent percentage change in consumption)
Comparison across balanced paths 0.0794 0
With same initial capital 0.0787 0
18We use 1986 to estimate congestion because the survey on the time individuals spend shopping that we
have on hand refers to that year. The data was downloaded in July 1, 2002 from http://stats.bls.gov/data/
home.htm (production employees in retail trade: 15.924 million, average hours worked by production
employees: 29.2).
19This is the most recent estimate of average time allocated to shopping that we could find. We do not
expect that indices of congestion vary dramatically over time.
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percent drop in consumption. When the transitional costs of changing the capital
stock are taken into account this percentage drops slightly to 7.87.20 This large
welfare cost is not easy to avoid with correcting policies. For example, regulating the
price schedule in a directed search equilibrium leads only to a negligible welfare
improvement equivalent to less than a 105 percent increase in consumption. (This
improvement would be zero if the production technology were linear instead of
Cobb–Douglas). The large difference in welfare between a directed search
equilibrium and the first best allocation is due to the necessity of financing retail
costs with large commercial mark-ups. This inefficiency is unavoidable in the absence
of some form of lump-sum taxes which would allow to subsidize retail trade.
8. Conclusion and extensions
Search models have been used to study decentralized markets where traders meet
bilaterally. These models have been useful to analyze the labor market. Also, with
the work of Kiyotaki and Wright [6,7] they have become the dominant paradigm for
the theoretical microfoundations of money. Our paper uses a search model to
capture some important features of the retail sector.
We adopt the concept of directed search equilibrium in an environment with
private information in order to capture the following features of retail trade. The
cost of a single transaction is small, yet buyers and sellers spend large amounts of
labor performing transactions. The matching of buyers and sellers is in general
frictional. Sellers post prices to attract buyers. Both buyers and sellers care about the
probability of realizing a trade in a given period. Finally, retail prices are typically
anonymous, imply no payments if there are no purchases, and involve quantity
discounts.
In this framework, we study the welfare properties of a directed search equilibrium
allocation by comparing it to the allocation chosen by a central planner. If the
planner faces the same informational constraints as the market and only has control
of the market prices, then the directed search equilibrium allocation coincides with
the choice of the planner when the production technology is linear. However, if the
planner can use lump-sum taxes to subsidize sales, the planner can improve upon the
equilibrium allocation. In fact, the planner can achieve the first best allocation by
introducing a linear subsidy on sales.
Even if large commercial margins are unavoidable in the absence of lump-sum
taxation, their existence is important for policy design. For example, large
commercial margins have a profound effect on the welfare cost of sales taxes,
because a zero tax rate on sales is already a large departure from the first best, the
standard result that small taxes cause negligible dead-weight-losses does not apply.
Moreover, because of standard tax equivalence results, the welfare costs of income
taxes must also be much larger when commercial margins are taken into account.
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The informational structure in our model allows us to generate retail prices that
are anonymous and include no flat fees. For some applications, one may wish to
abstract from the specific form the equilibrium pricing schedules take. In this case,
the model can be drastically simplified by either eliminating the preference shocks, or
assuming full information, or allowing two-tier pricing. Likewise, one may wish to
abstract from waiting times by buyers and idle spells by sellers. In this case, a further
simplification can be achieved assuming a frictionless matching technology.
For simplicity, we have abstracted from the existence of money by assuming that
payments can be made through a central clearing-house. In the absence of this
centralized system of payments, money is a useful device that facilitates trade as in
Kiyotaki and Wright [6,7]. Faig [4] introduces money in a simpler version of the
present model where sellers are restricted to make offers that consist of a single
quantity–payment pair. The main complication of introducing money in the present
set-up is that in equilibrium when buyers are lucky to find a good for which they
have a high valuation they would like to spend more money than they carry. Because
this is not possible, they are liquidity constrained. Moreover, these liquidity
constraints affect equilibrium price schedules. Despite this complication, the model
remains analytically tractable, but the algebraic expressions are longer and harder to
interpret than in the present contribution. For this reason, we plan to study the
monetary version of the present model in a separate paper.
Appendix
A.1. Derivation of (6)
We derive the hedonic measure of consumption in (6) from a standard Dixit–
Stiglitz aggregator by using the Law of Large Numbers. Let qj be the quantity
purchased and ej be the preference shock in each match j between a buyer of the
household and a seller. Because there is a countable number of such matches and a
continuum of goods for sale, with probability one an additional purchase brings a
new good to the set of goods consumed by the household. Therefore, the number of
goods the household can consume is equal to the number of matches.
Take the case where the set of household members is finite. In this case, the
number of goods the household can consume is also finite. We assume the following
Dixit–Stiglitz aggregator:
c ¼ 1
N
XJ
j¼1
ejq1sj
 ! 1
1s
; ðA:1Þ
where N denotes the number of household members and J denotes the number of
goods the household can consume. The variable c measures the per capita
contribution of the purchases of the household. The goods acquired have different
valuations for the household. For a given match j and a given quantity purchased qj ;
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the valuation is maximal when the realization of the shock is ej ¼ 1; and it declines
linearly to 0 as ej decreases to 0:
Taking limits as the number of household members goes to infinity (so the number
of goods the household can consume also goes to infinity) we have that
c ¼ lim
N-N
1
N
XJ
j¼1
ejq1sj
 ! 1
1s
¼ lim
N-N
J
N
XJ
j¼1
ejq1sj
J
 ! 1
1s
¼ bmbðyÞ lim
J-N
XJ
j¼1
ejq1sj
J
 ! 1
1s
: ðA:2Þ
When the number of household members is large, the number of goods purchased
per capita is limN-NJ=N ¼ bmbðyÞ: The average contribution of a purchase is
limJ-N
PJ
j¼1
ejq1sj
J
: The stochastic variables ej are uniformly distributed on the
interval ½0; 1 and are independent across matches. Let qe denote the quantity
purchased by a buyer when the realization of the preference shock is e: Applying the
Law of Large Numbers to expression (A.2) implies the formula in (6).
Proof of Proposition 1. Let the indirect utility of a type-e buyer be defined as
ve  Ubðqe; ze; eÞ: ðA:3Þ
Using ve; the incentive compatibility constraint (19) can be restated with the help of
the following standard result (see [8, Proposition 23.D.2]):
Lemma. A direct revelation mechanism satisfies the incentive compatibility constraint
(19) if and only if qe is non-decreasing in e and the indirect utility function satisfies
ve ¼ v0 þ
Z e
0
@
@x
Ubðqx; zx; xÞ dx ¼ v0 þ
Z e
0
cq1sx
1 s dx; for all eA½0; 1: ðA:4Þ
Using this lemma and constraints (20) and (21) together with the definitions (15),
(17), and (A.3), the incentive efficient direct revelation mechanisms can be
characterized as the solution to the following program:
max
fqe;vegeA½0;1
Z 1
0
ð1 oÞve þ o ecq
1s
e
1 s  mqe  ve
  
de ðA:5Þ
subject to21
’ve ¼ cq
1s
e
1 s ; ðA:6Þ
qeX0; ðA:7Þ
veX0; ðA:8Þ
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pe  ecq
1s
e
1 s  ve  mqeX0; ðA:9Þ
qe is non-decreasing; ðA:10Þ
q0 ¼ 0; and v0 ¼ 0: ðA:11Þ
Here, pe denotes the seller’s surplus upon meeting a buyer of type e: The payment in
the transaction satisfies:
lze ¼ ecq
1s
e
1 s  ve ¼ pe þ mqe: ðA:12Þ
This program can be solved with a standard application of the Pontryagin’s
Maximum Principle. We organize the solution to the program in three
steps:
(a) Constraints (A.6)–(A.11) imply that there is a gA½0; 1Þ such that the solution
fqe; vegeA½0;1 to program (A.5) obeys: qe ¼ 0 and ve ¼ 0 for eA½0; g; and qe40 and
ve40 for e4g:
Constraints (A.10) and (A.11) immediately imply that there is gA½0; 1 such that
qe ¼ 0 for eA½0; g; and qe40 for e4g: When qe ¼ 0; constraints (A.8) and (A.9)
imply that ve ¼ 0: With these results, constraint (A.6) implies that qe40 if and only if
ve40: Finally, if g were 1, the optimized value of (A.5) would be zero, which cannot
be a solution to the maximization program because there are many feasible direct
revelation mechanisms that achieve a positive value. For example, qe ¼ ve ¼ 0 if
eo0:5; and qe ¼ ðcð2e1Þm Þ
1
s and ve ¼ 12 s1s½cð2e 1Þ
1
sm
s1
s otherwise.22 &
(b) For oAð0:5; 1; the solution to program (A.5) subject to (A.6)–(A.11), is the
following:
qe ¼
0 for 0peog;
c
m
e g
1 g
 1
s
for gpep1;
8><
>: and; ðA:13Þ
ve ¼
0 for 0peog;
smð1 gÞ
1 s
c
m
e g
1 g
 1
s
for gpep1;
8><
>: ðA:14Þ
where
g ¼ 2o 1
3o 1: ðA:15Þ
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Let ze denote the co-state variable associated with the differential equation (A.6).
The current-value Hamiltonian of the program is
Hðqe; ve; ze; eÞ ¼ ð1 oÞve þ o
ecq1se
1 s  mqe  ve
 
þ ze
cq1se
1 s : ðA:16Þ
The first-order necessary condition with respect to the control variable qe is
ðHqe ¼ 0Þ:
oðceqse  mÞ þ zecqse ¼ 0: ðA:17Þ
The co-state variable must obey ð’ze ¼ HveÞ:
’ze ¼ ð1 2oÞ: ðA:18Þ
Finally, the transversality implies23
z1 ¼ 0: ðA:19Þ
The value of the co-state variable ze can be solved for explicitly using conditions
(A.18) and (A.19)
ze ¼ ð2o 1Þðe 1Þ: ðA:20Þ
Substituting (A.20) into (A.17), solving for qe; and using (A.15), we obtain
qe ¼ cm
e g
1 g
 1
s
: ðA:21Þ
Integrating (A.6) from g to e and noting that vg ¼ 0; we obtain
ve ¼ s
1 sð1 gÞmqe: ðA:22Þ
Finally, using the definition of pe in (A.9), we obtain
pe ¼ g mqe
1 s sþ
1 e
e g
 
: ðA:23Þ
So far, we have disregarded constraints (A.7) to (A.11). However, for eXg; the values
of qe; ve; and pe in (A.21)–(A.23) are well defined and satisfy these constraints.
Moreover, at e ¼ g; qe ¼ ve ¼ 0: Hence, (a) implies qe ¼ ve ¼ pe ¼ 0 for epg: The
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Hamiltonian is strictly concave with respect to qe; and when the Hamiltonian is
evaluated at the optimal choice of qe it is concave with respect to ve: Therefore,
(A.13)–(A.15) characterize the unique maximum of the program. &
(c) For oA½0; 0:5; the solution to program (A.5) subject to (A.6)–(A.11), is the
following:
qe ¼ cme
 1
s ðA:24Þ
and
ve ¼ s
1 s mqe: ðA:25Þ
When o ¼ 0:5; the variable ve cancels in the objective (A.5) so the problem
becomes separable across types. Ignoring constraints (A.9) and (A.10), the first-order
conditions of the problem yield (A.24). Integrating (A.6) from 0 to e and noting
v0 ¼ 0; we obtain (A.25). Using the definition in (A.9), we obtain pe ¼ 0 for all
eA½0; 1: The values of qe and ve in (A.24) and (A.25) satisfy constraints (A.9) and
(A.10), so they solve program (A.5) subject to (A.6)–(A.11). Furthermore, the
solution for o ¼ 0:5 maximizes the expected payoff of the buyer subject to a zero
expected payoff for the seller. A fortiori, given constraint (A.9), the same solution
must apply for oA½0; 0:5Þ; which assigns a lower weight to the seller in the
maximized welfare function (A.5). &
Finally, Proposition 1 results from combining steps (b) and (c) together with
(A.12).
Proof of Proposition 2. A buyer facing a price schedule g purchases a quantity that
satisfies the following specialization of (11)
ecqse ¼ gcqse þ ð1 gÞm: ðA:26Þ
Solving this equation for qe; we obtain (22). Using (25), the implied payments are
given by (23). Finally, g taking values in the interval ½0; 0:5 spans all values of g
attained in (24) for oA½0; 1: Thus, Proposition 2 follows. &
Proof of Proposition 3. Given that the equilibrium variables are recursively
determined by the set of equations described in the main text, existence and
uniqueness is implied if Eqs. (35) and (40) have a unique admissible solution. The
right-hand side of (35) is a continuous and decreasing function of y; which image
spans the interval ð0; 2: The left-hand side of (35) is a continuous and non-
decreasing function of y; which is bounded away from 0 and 1. Therefore, Eq. (35)
has a unique solution.
The left-hand side of (40) is a decreasing function of n that maps ½0; 1 onto ½0;NÞ;
while the right-hand side is positive and independent of n: Hence, Eq. (40) has a
unique solution for n in the interval ð0; 1Þ: &
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Proof of Proposition 4. Eq. (50) together with the definitions of y; mb; and Z in (1),
(2), and (32), implies (51) and (54). The labor allocation constraint together with (51)
and (54) yields (53). Using (47) to solve the integrals in (49) and (46), we obtain
f 0ðnÞ ¼ Msðb; sÞ s
2
1 s2
c
m
 1
s ðA:27Þ
and
f ðnÞ ¼ Mðb; sÞ s
1þ s
c
m
 1
s
: ðA:28Þ
Definitions (1), (2), and (32) imply
Msðb; sÞ
Mðb; sÞ ¼
1 ZðyÞ
s
: ðA:29Þ
Eq. (52) results from combining (53) with (A.27)–(A.29). Finally, combining (47) and
(A.28), we obtain (55). &
Proof of Proposition 5. The equations that determine y and n in a directed search
equilibrium, (31) and (35), (40), and in the first best allocation, (51) and (52), can be
written as follows:
1
a1 þ y ¼ 1 ZðyÞ ðA:30Þ
and
ð1 nÞf 0ðnÞ
f ðnÞ ¼
s
1 s a2; ðA:31Þ
where a1 ¼ a2 ¼ 1 in the first best, and a1 ¼ 0:5; a2 ¼ ð1þ yÞ=ð0:5þ yÞ41 in
equilibrium. The Implicit Function Theorem applied to (A.30) and (A.31) yields
dy=da1o0 and dn=da240: Hence, we obtain (57) and (56).
If f has constant elasticity a; equations (39)–(40) and (52)–(53) imply
s
n
¼ s½1 ZðyÞ
að1 sÞ ; ðA:32Þ
for both the first best and the equilibrium. Therefore, (58) follows from (A.32), (56),
and Z being a non-increasing function of y:
The resource constraint (8) together with f being constant returns to scale implies
that
%q
%q
¼
s
n
msðyÞ
s
n
msðyÞ
: ðA:33Þ
Therefore, (59) follows from (58), (56), and ms being increasing. &
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Proof of Proposition 6. The proof is a simple variation of that of Proposition 5 and is
thus omitted.
Proof of Proposition 7. (a) When buyer types are public information the directed
search equilibrium and the first best allocations coincide.
As in Section 4, all bilateral trades must be pairwise efficient in equilibrium and
the marginal rates of substitution between y and x of buyers and sellers must
coincide. With full information, the efficient quantities qe are calculated by
maximizing the trade surplus, Ub þ Us:
qe ¼ arg max ecq
1s
e
1 s  mqe
 
: ðA:34Þ
The solution to (A.34) is
qe ¼ cem
 1
s
: ðA:35Þ
The expected trade surplus isZ 1
0
ecq1se
1 s  mqe
 
de ¼ s
2
1 s2 c
1
sm
s1
s : ðA:36Þ
When the market tightness is y and buyers receive a fraction x of the trade surplus,
the expected utilities of buyers and sellers are
Vbðy; xÞ ¼ xmbðyÞ s
2
1 s2c
1
sm
s1
s ; ðA:37Þ
and
Vsðy; xÞ ¼ ð1 xÞmsðyÞ s
2
1 s2c
1
sm
s1
s : ðA:38Þ
In a directed search equilibrium, the marginal rates of substitution between y and x
of buyers and sellers must coincide. Differentiating (A.37) and (A.38), this implies
x ¼ ZðyÞ: ðA:39Þ
Households allocate b and s so Vbðy; xÞ ¼ Vsðy; xÞ: Using (A.37) and (A.38), this
equality yields (51). Also, households allocate s and n so Vsðy; xÞ ¼ mf 0ðnÞ: Using
(A.38) and (A.39) this equality implies
mf 0ðnÞ ¼ msðyÞ½1 ZðyÞ s
2
1 s2c
1
sm
s1
s : ðA:40Þ
Using (A.35) to calculate the average sales, the resource constraint becomes
f ðnÞ ¼ smsðyÞ s
1þ s
c
m
 1
s
: ðA:41Þ
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Combining (A.40) and (A.41), and using (1), (51), and (10), we obtain (52) and (53).
From (A.40),
c
m
 1
s¼ f ðnÞ
smsðyÞ
1þ s
s
; ðA:42Þ
which combined with (2) and (A.35) gives (55). This completes the proof of (a).
(b) If buyer types are private information but sellers charge a lump-sum fee to
prospective buyers prior to the realization of e; then the directed search equilibrium and
the first best allocations coincide.
Let p be the fee a seller charges to prospective buyers. After the fee p has been paid
and e is realized, the trading game between a buyer and a seller is identical to the one
in Section 4. Hence, the payment schedule net of the fee p that implements incentive
efficient direct revelation mechanisms has still the functional form (25) and the
quantities purchased by the buyer are given by (22). The expected utilities of the
traders in a market with congestion y; price schedule g; and fee p are
Vbðy; g; pÞ ¼ mbðyÞ s
2
1 s2 c
1
sm
s1
s g2  lp
 
ðA:43Þ
and
Vsðy; g; pÞ ¼ msðyÞ 2s
2
1 s2c
1
sm
s1
s gð1 gÞ þ lp
 
: ðA:44Þ
In a directed search equilibrium, the marginal rates of substitution of y for g; and of g
for p must be equal for buyers and sellers, so
ZðyÞ  1
ZðyÞ ¼
g
1 2g
2s2
1s2 c
1
sm
s1
s gð1 gÞ þ lp
s2
1s2 c
1
sm
s1
s g2  lp
ðA:45Þ
g ¼ 1: ðA:46Þ
Substituting (A.46) in (A.45) and solving for p;
p ¼ 1
l
s2
1 s2c
1
sm
s1
s ½1 ZðyÞ: ðA:47Þ
Note that this fee implies Vbðy; g; pÞ40; so buyers are willing to pay the fee.
Households allocate b and s so Vbðy; g; pÞ ¼ Vsðy; g; pÞ: Using (A.46) and (A.47),
this equality yields (51). Also, households allocate s and n so Vsðy; g; pÞ ¼ mf 0ðnÞ
Using (A.46) and (A.47), this equality yields (A.40). To show that (52), (53) and (55)
hold, we use the exact same steps used in the proof of (a). &
Proof of Proposition 8. A type-e buyer chooses
qe ¼ arg max ecq
1s
1 s  lZðqÞ
 
¼ ce
mZ
 1
s
: ðA:48Þ
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Hence, the return of a seller when matched with a type-e buyer is
lTZðqeÞ  mqe ¼ ðTZ 1Þmqe ¼ sð1 ZÞ
1 s
ce
mZ
 1
s
m; ðA:49Þ
where Z ¼ ZðyÞ and y is the first-best level of congestion given by (51). By (51), Zp1:
Thus, the seller’s individual rationality constraint is satisfied.
When the market tightness is y; the expected utilities of the traders are
VbðyÞ ¼ mbðyÞZ s
2
1 s2
c
mZ
 1
s
m; ðA:50Þ
VsðyÞ ¼ msðyÞð1 ZÞ s
2
1 s2
c
mZ
 1
s
m: ðA:51Þ
The household chooses its labor allocation so that VbðyÞ ¼ VsðyÞ ¼ mf 0ðnÞ: The first
equality implies that y satisfies (51) so Z ¼ ZðyÞ: The second one implies
f 0ðnÞ ¼ msðyÞð1 ZÞ s
2
1 s2
c
mZ
 1
s
: ðA:52Þ
Using (A.48) to calculate the average sales, the resource constraint becomes
f ðnÞ ¼ smsðyÞ s
1þ s
c
mZ
 1
s
: ðA:53Þ
Combining (A.52) and (A.53), and using (1), (51), and (10), we obtain (52) and (53).
From (A.53),
c
m
 1
s¼ f ðnÞ
smsðyÞ
1þ s
s
Z
1
s; ðA:54Þ
which combined with (2) and (A.48) gives (55). &
Proof of Proposition 9. The direct revelation mechanism chosen by the planner must
be incentive efficient, so we can restrict our search to price schedules in (25) for some
unknown parameter g: Substituting (22) into (6), solving for the integral, and using
(2) we obtain
c ¼ sm
sðyÞs
1þ s ð1 gÞð1þ sgÞ
  1
1s c
m
 1
s
: ðA:55Þ
Denoting f ðnÞ ¼ a þ wn; and using (7), (8), (34), (37), (39), and (40), Eq. (A.55)
simplifies to
c ¼ 2ws
2
1þ s
  s
1s
ð1 sÞða þ wÞ 11s½gð1 gÞmsðyÞ s1s: ðA:56Þ
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Since (34) holds, the maximization of c implies:
ð2g 1ÞmsðyÞ þ gð1 gÞðmsÞ0ðyÞ 1
2g2
¼ 0: ðA:57Þ
Given (32) and (34), (A.57) implies (31). &
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